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I. INTRODUCTION
2Q$SULO   WKH'HPRFUDWLF 3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF RI.RUHD 1RUWK
Korea) unilaterally pulled its 53,000 workers from the Kaesong Industrial 
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Complex (KIC),1 effectively shutting down the complex, which had been 
jointly run with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) since 2002.2 North 
Korea initially took a very hard stance against South Korea, refusing to 
accept even the minimum humanitarian aid needed for the KIC workers.3
North Korea then blamed South Korea for the closure of the KIC, despite its 
unilateral action in shutting down the complex, and refused to allow tenant 
companies to take out their raw materials and finished products from the 
KIC, increasing the tension between the countries.4 Finally, after seven 
rounds of inter-Korean negotiations, North and South Korea reached an 
agreement to reopen the complex.5 On August 14, 2013, steps were taken to 
restart operations at the KIC by creating a joint committee and four sub-
FRPPLWWHHV WR JLYH HDFK JRYHUQPHQW ³DQ HTXDO VD\ LQ WKH UXQQLQJ RI WKH

*Juris Doctor Candidate 2015, Pepperdine University School of Law.  This article was originally 
written in Fall 2013 and reflects the situations present during that time.
1. Koreas Agree to Reopen Joint Factory Park Next Week, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 
11, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/09/11/8/0301000000AEN20130911001
653315F.html.  Other known spellings of the complex name include Kaeseong, Gaesung, or 
Gaeseong.  Kaesong was one of three special economic zones (in addition to Shinuiju and 
Kumgangsan) that North Korea designated in order to open doors to foreign investment and improve 
the economic downfall in the country.  Jeehye You, Legislative Reform of the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex in North Korea, 29 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 36, 42 (2011).
2. Gi-Hyoung Oh, The Legal Framework of the Gaesung Industrial Complex, 5 J. KOR. L. 21 
(2005).  North Korea first prohibited South Korean workers to enter the KIC on April 3, 2014, then 
tentatively suspended the KIC on April 8, until finally removing its workers on April 9.  Unification 
6SRNHVSHUVRQ¶V6WDWHPHQWRQWKH*DHVHRQJ ,QGXVWULDO&RPSOH[ *,&, MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION
(April 25, 2013), http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1834&mode=view&page=
5&cid=31637.  
3. Unification SpoNHVSHUVRQ¶V6WDWHPHQWRQWKH*DHVHRQJ,QGXVWULDO&RPSOH[, supra note 2.
4. 8QLILFDWLRQ 6SRNHVSHUVRQ¶V 6WDWHPHQW 5HJDUGLQJ WKH &XUUHQW 6WDWXV RQ WKH .RUHDQ
Peninsula and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex(GIC), MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION (May 19, 2013), 
http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1834&mode=view&page=5&cid=31642.
5. Rebirth of Factory Park, KOR. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, http://koreatimes.co.kr/
www/news/opinon/2013/09/137_142702.html.
2
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complex WKDWZDVSUHYLRXVO\RYHUVHHQE\D1RUWK.RUHDQJRYHUQLQJERG\´6
The committees reached a deal on September 11, 2013 after overnight 
negotiations, agreeing to resume operations at the KIC.7 The shutdown 
lasted 161 days.8
The agreement to reopen the KIC cDPH DPLGVW 1RUWK .RUHD¶V
postponement of family reunions scheduled for the end of September, which 
³GDPSHQHGKRSHVIRULPSURYHGLQWHU-Korean ties after recent moves by both 
.RUHDVWRHDVHWHQVLRQVFUHDWHGE\WKH1RUWK¶VQXFOHDUWHVWLQ)HEUXDU\DQG
threats RIZDUODVWVSULQJ´9 The fact that the newly restarted operations at 
the KIC were not affected by the postponement of the family reunions 
demonstrates that, despite the complicated and tense relationship that exists 
between North and South Korea, the two governments may be able to civilly 
negotiate and resolve the issues they believe are important.  The key issue 
during the KIC negotiations was determining how to fully prevent unilateral 
shutdowns of the KIC in the future.10 Despite some tension over this issue, 
the two Koreas eventually agreed that operations at the KIC should not be 

6. Koreas Working on Details for Complete Reopening of Kaesong Complex, YONHAP NEWS 
AGENCY, Sept. 10, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/09/10/43/0301000000AEN
20130910001151315F.html. 
7. Rebirth of Factory Park, supra note 5.
8. Id.      
9. Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Postpones Family Reunion Program, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/world/asia/north-korea-postpones-family-reunion-
program.html?_r=0. 
10. 52. *RYHUQPHQW¶V ([SODQDWLRQ RQ WKH WK ,QWHU-Korean Working-Level Talks on 
Gaeseong Industrial Complex, MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION (Aug. 6, 2013), 
KWWSHQJXQLNRUHDJRNUFRQWHQWGR"FPVLG 	PRGH YLHZ	SDJH 	FLG ³North Korea 
SURSRVHGDQHZFODXVHZKLFKVWDWH>G@WKDWµ1RUWK.RUHDZLOOQRWXQLODWHUDOO\SURKLELW WKHHQWU\RI
South Korean workers to the GIC or withdraw North Korean workers only if South Korea promises 
not to use inappropriate political rhetoric and pledges not to pose military threats against North 
.RUHD¶´ Id. HPSKDVLVDGGHG 6RXWK.RUHDUHIXVHGWRDFFHSWWKLVFODXVHVHHNLQJ1RUWK.RUHD¶V
DJUHHPHQW WR ³QRW WDNH XQLODWHUDOPHDVXUHV WKDW GLVFRXUDJH WKH QRUPDO RSHUDWLRQ RI WKH*,&   
XQGHUDQ\FLUFXPVWDQFH´,GHPSKDVLVDGGHG
3
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stopped again regardless of the inter-Korean situation,11 demonstrating that 
at least on paper they were willing to treat the KIC as an independent issue 
from other inter-.RUHDQ FRQIOLFWV DQG LVVXHV  :KLOH 1RUWK .RUHD¶V
XQSUHGLFWDEOHDWWLWXGHSUHYHQWV6RXWK.RUHDIURPIXOO\ WUXVWLQJWKH1RUWK¶V
promises, by separating the different issues on the table and finding a way to 
protect the South from unnecessary harm, South Korea may be able to find a 
way to continue to work with North Korea in resolving other conflicts 
between the two nations.
Resolving the KIC conflict may be a sliver of hope in what has been a 
tense and rocky relationship between the two Koreas.  The negotiations that 
arose out of the KIC conflict can be a helpful case study to observe how 
South Korea can continue to improve its relations with the highly irrational 
North Korea.  Despite other inter-.RUHDQWHQVLRQVDQG1RUWK.RUHD¶VHUUDWLF
behavior in unilaterally shutting down the KIC for five months, South Korea 
was able to find a way to negotiate the reopening of the KIC and make 
amendments to the existing KIC legislation.  These observations can also be 
applied to resolve conflicts between other nations or parties²in cases where 
there is an imbalance of power and a strong sense of unpredictability on one 
side.

11. Two Koreas Agree to Reopen Kaesong Industrial Complex, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 
14, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/08/14/78/0401000000AEN2013
0814010600315F.html; Agreement on Normalization of the Gaeesong Industrial Complex,
MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION (Aug. 16, 2013), http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.
do?cmsid=1834&mode=view&page=3&cid=31653 [hereinafter Agreement on Normalization].  The 
XQRIILFLDOWUDQVODWLRQRIWKHLQLWLDODJUHHPHQWSRVWHGE\6RXWK.RUHD¶V0LQLVWU\RI8QLILFDWLRQVWDWHV
the first clause: 
South and North Korea agreed that a temporary suspension of the GIC caused by the 
withdrawal of workers and disapproval of entry should not occur again.  Without being 
affected by any political situation, South and North Korea must guarantee normal 
RSHUDWLRQ RI WKH*,& LQFOXGLQJ6RXWK.RUHDQZRUNHUV¶ HQWU\ LQWR1RUWK.RUHD1RUWK
.RUHDQZRUNHUV¶UHJXODUZRUNLQJKRXUVDQGSURWHFWLRQRIFRPSDQ\DVVHWV
Id. (emphasis added).
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Section I briefly introduces the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and its 
closure and reopening.  Section II looks at the history of North and South 
Korea that has set up the current tension between the nations.  Section III 
KLJKOLJKWV WKH VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH .,& WR WKH WZR .RUHDV¶ UHODWLRQVKLS
6HFWLRQ ,9 WKHQ H[SORUHV 1RUWK .RUHD¶V EHKDYLRU RYHU WKH \HDUV
LQWHUWZLQLQJ GLVFXVVLRQ RI 7KRPDV 6FKHOOLQJ¶V ³0DGPDQ 7KHRU\´ WR
GHVFULEH1RUWK.RUHD¶VJURZLQJXQSUHGLFWDELOLW\DQG LUUDWLRQDOLW\ 6HFWLRQ
V provides suggestions for how South Korea can appeDVH 1RUWK .RUHD¶V
erratic behavior, as exemplified by their actions during the KIC negotiations.  
Section VI concludes.
II. HISTORY OF THE TWO KOREAS
North and South Korea have a very unique relationship²one not often 
seen in the global context²that stems from the initial division of the country 
along the 38th parallel in the aftermath of World War II (WWII).12 Korea 
KDG EHHQ XQGHU -DSDQ¶V FRORQLDO UXOH VLQFH  DQG ZKHQ -DSDQ ZDV
defeated in WWII, the USSR and the United States agreed to temporarily 
divLGH .RUHD DORQJ WKH WK SDUDOOHO XQGHU D ³WUXVWHHVKLS´ WR SUHSDUH DQG
ease Korea into an independent state.13 However, conflicting opinions 
between the USSR and the United States resulted in the South and North 
having separate elections and setting up separate governments, making the 
temporary division of Korea permanent and fueling what would become the 
Korean War.14 Unfortunately, the Korean War did not provide a resolution 

12. Rowena Hammal, Destined to Fail? How the Division of Korea led to the Korean War,
HISTORY REV., Sept. 2010, available at http://www.historytoday.com/rowena-hammal/destined-fail-
how-division-korea-led-korean-war-0.
13. Id.
14. Id. Efforts were initially made by the United Nations as well to pave way for a single 
Korean government, but were rejected by the North, which began to set up its own regime amidst the 
growth of political factions.  INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION,
5
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for the separated Koreas.  It instead ended with a ceasefire sixty years ago, 
as the two sides signed an Armistice Agreement instead of a formal peace 
treaty on July 27, 1953,15 once again confirming the division of the two 
Koreas.16
Initially after the Korean War, the North Korean economy grew quickly 
under its first leader, Kim Il-sung, resulting in a higher gross national 
product (GNP) than South Korea until the early 1970s.17 However, famines 
began to affect North Korea in the 1990s, killing almost two million 
people.18 Thus, there was a great need for North Korea to get international
support to save its people and revive its economy.19 North Korea received 
food aid from South Korea and the global community, which helped prevent 
another famine as bad as the one in the 1990s, and North Korea developed 
three special economic zones²Shinuiju, Kumgangsan, and Kaesong²to 
provide financial support for the country through foreign investment.20

UNDERSTANDING NORTH KOREA 26 (2012), available at
http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1820 (accessed by clicking on the download link).  In 
1950, the North invaded the South, starting the Korean War that lasted three years.  Id. at 27.  
15. INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, at 147. 
16. Eun-jung Kim, Poland Promises to Continue Armistice Monitoring Mission, YONHAP 
NEWS AGENCY, July 27, 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/fullstory/2013/07/27/73/4500000000
AEN20130727002100320F.HTML. 
17. You, supra note 1, at 40.
18. Id. 6RXWK.RUHD¶V,QVWLWXWHIRU8QLILFDWLRQ(GXFDWLRQSXEOLVKHGLQ
1RUWK.RUHD¶V IRRG SURGXFWLRQ SOXQJHG EHORZ PLOOLRQ WRQV SHU \HDU    GXH WR WKH
reduction of aid from socialist countries and barter trade, decline in raw materials for 
agriculture due to economic hardship, and a series of natural disasters. . . .  [During] the 
worst years of the famine, food production barely reached 3.54 million tons on average.  
This decline in yield resulted in a shortfall of an average of 1.64 million tons to the 
amount needed for the already-reduced ration system. 
INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, at 189.
19. You, supra note 1, at 41-42.
20. Id. at 42; see supra text accompanying note 1.  
6
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss3/8
[Vol. 15: 639, 2015] Stopping the Madman
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
645
:KLOH WKH FRXQWU\¶V HFRQRPLF VWDWH ZDV IDOWHULQJ 1RUWK .RUHD
GHYHORSHG LWV PLOLWDU\ SRZHU DQG KDV DGYRFDWHG D ³PLOLWDU\-ILUVW SROLF\´
since 1998.21 Indeed, North Korea has initiated 120 provocations since June 
 DJDLQVW 6RXWK .RUHD WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV DQG -DSDQ ³UDQJ>LQJ@ IURP
multiple assassination attempts on South Korean presidents, to the 
infiltration of thousands of armed agents involved in kidnapping and 
terrorism, from the mid-air bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 
passenger plane in 1987 to the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo, a surveillance 
VKLS´22 North Korea developed nuclear weapons and conducted nuclear 
WHVWV ³WR VHFXUH PLOLWDU\ VXSHULRULW\ over others, to have an effective 
EDUJDLQLQJ FKLS DQG WR SURPRWH LQWHUQDO XQLW\´23 Efforts were made in 
WRSXWDVWRSWR1RUWK.RUHD¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPWKURXJKWKH6L[3DUW\
Talks24 that included North and South Korea, the United States, China, 
Japan, and Russia.25 However, the talks proved to be futile when North 
Korea walked away in 2009 and refused to continue negotiations.26

21. INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, at 106.
22. Morse Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Past Failures, Present Solutions, 50 ST.
LOUIS U. L. J. 517, 522-23 (2006).
23. INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, at 132.
24. Multilateral talks were held between the six nations, and bilateral talks were held between 
1RUWK.RUHDDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQRUGHUWRGLVDEOH1RUWK.RUHD¶VQXFOHDUIDFLOLWLHVLQH[FKDQJH
for a normalization of relations.  Id. at 83.  However, North Korea continued to carry out nuclear 
tests without much indication that they would follow through with the agreement to denuclearize 
their state.  Id. at 84.
25. Jayshree Bajoria & Beina Xu, 7KH6L[3DUW\7DONVRQ1RUWK.RUHD¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDP,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-
north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593.
26. Id.  The UN Security Council designated three North Korean companies for sanctions after 
the North launched a long-range missile on April 5, 2009, and in response, North Korea stated that it
would no longer participate in the Six Party Talks.  INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra
note 14, at 84.  The new sanctions included imposing stronger regulations against North Korea, such 
DV³UHLQIRUFLQJFDUJRLQVSHFWLRQDWVHDLQWHQVLILHGILQDQFial and banking control, and extended arms 
7
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Since then, North Korea has continued to demonstrate its militant 
power.  On March 26, 2010, the Cheonan, a South Korean warship, 
exploded and sank, killing forty-six sailors,27 which South Korea has blamed 
on a torpedo fired by North Korea.28 On November 23, 2010, North Korea 
³ILUHGRYHUVKHOOVRQWRDQGDURXQG6RXWK.RUHDQFLYLOLDQLQVWDOODWLRQVRQ
Yeonpyeong Island, killing two civilians and two South Korean marines . . .
and injuring forty-IRXU LVODQGHUV DQG VHUYLFHPHQ´29 In response, South 
Korea enacted sanctions on North Korea that ended all inter-Korean 
exchanges except for the KIC.30
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
Amidst these uneasy inter-Korean relations, the KIC surprisingly 
managed to remain in operation until North Korea pulled its workers in 
April 2013.31 It is quite notable that the KIC managed to withstand intense 

HPEDUJR´Id. Bilateral talks with the United States continued, but without much success.  Id. at 84-
85.
27. You, supra note 1, at 37.
28. INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, at 71; CNN Library, North Korea 
Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-fast-
facts/.
29. You, supra note 1, at 38; see also INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, 
at 71.
30. Min-uck Chung, Seoul Considers Lifting NK Sanctions, KOR. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2013, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/11/485_145439.html.  The international 
FRPPXQLW\DOVRHQDFWHGVWURQJVDQFWLRQVDJDLQVW1RUWK.RUHD³ZRUVHQ>LQJ@WKHUHJLPH¶VLVRODWLRQ´
INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra QRWHDW³>7@KH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQG-DSDQOHQW
DFWLYHVXSSRUW WR6RXWK.RUHD¶VVWDQFH>@   VWURQJO\FRQGHPQ>LQJ@1RUWK.RUHD>DQG@UHQGHULQJ
their support both to joint investigations and sanctions against it, in addition to urging the UN
6HFXULW\&RXQFLODQGRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQVWRLVVXHFRQGHPQDWLRQVRILWVEHKDYLRU´ Id. 
at 72.  Japan also reinforced their own bilateral sanctions against North Korea, by prohibiting all 
exports to North Korea.  Id. at 89.
31. Unification 6SRNHVSHUVRQ¶V6WDWHPHQWRQWKH*DHVHRQJ,QGXVWULDO&RPSOH[, supra note 2.
8
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conflict and tension between the two Koreas, which shows the great 
potential for the KIC to act as a central piece for the two countries to build 
better relations and potentially pave the road to reunification.32
The power of the KIC probably rests in the important economic role that 
LW SOD\V IRU 1RUWK .RUHD  7KH .,& ³RIIHUV SRWHQWLDOO\  MREV DQG
HQDEOHVWKH1RUWKWRµVHOOQRWRQO\UDZDQGVXSSOHPHQWDU\PDWHULDOVEXWDOVR
LPSRVHWUDQVSRUWDWLRQIHHVWD[HVDQGFROOHFWIRUHLJQFXUUHQF\DVZHOO¶´33 It 
provides great financial support for the weak North Korean economy.  The 
KIC can act as a stepping stone for North Korea to reach out to foreign 
investors, build new relationships with other governments, and improve its 
reputation in the international community.
The KIC also benefits South Korea by providing a cheap labor force for 
South Korean companies in close proximity to Seoul.34 South Korean 
businesses have found more success at the KIC as compared to around 40% 
of South Korean companies whose plants have been unsuccessful in China.35
Thus, since both countries have a need for the KIC and each is gaining value 
IURP WKH FRPSOH[ IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH .RUHDV¶ UHODWLRQVKLS DQG QHJRWLDWLRQV
surrounding the operations of the KIC will be a helpful point of discussion to 
determine how SoXWK .RUHD FDQ DQG VKRXOG UHVSRQG WR 1RUWK .RUHD¶V
unpredictable behaviors.
Even though technically remaining at war, the Korean governments 
have managed to co-exist and negotiate over the last fifty years on issues 

32. 7KH.DHVRQJ ,QGXVWULDO&RPSOH[ LV RQH RI WKH IHZ ³V\PEROV RI LQWHU-Korean economic 
FRRSHUDWLRQ´ WKDWH[LVWV LQ WKHPLGVWRIDYHU\GHOLFDWH UHODWLRQVKLS 2K supra note 2, at 40.  As 
VXFK GHVSLWH EHLQJ MRLQWO\ RSHUDWHG 1RUWK .RUHD¶V DELOLW\ WR XQLODWHUDOO\ VKXW GRZQ WKH .,&
provides an interesting backdrop on which to examine inter-Korean relations and the balance of 
power between the two governments. 
33. You, supra note 1, at 43.
34. Id. The KIC is only thirty-seven miles from downtown Seoul and provides a cost-efficient 
alternative for South Korean companies than their plants in other countries, such as China.  Id. at 43-
44.
35. Id. at 44.
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UDQJLQJ IURP1RUWK.RUHD¶V XVH RI QXFOHDU weapons to organizing family 
reunions for those separated by the Korean War.  However, maintaining a 
VWDEOH UHODWLRQVKLS KDV QRW EHHQ HDV\ SDUWLFXODUO\ EHFDXVH 1RUWK .RUHD¶V
irrational threats and actions²such as the recent shutdown of the KIC²
make it difficult for South Korea to maintain any particular policy towards 
North Korea.
North Korea was able to easily shutdown the KIC due to flaws in the 
original KIC legislation, which left South Korea, its businesses, and its 
people unprotected from North Korean control over the KIC.36 There were 
insufficient regulations regarding real estate, personal safety, criminal 
investigation, and litigation processes.37 There was no definition of the legal 
grounds for arrest or search of foreigners, which allowed the general North 
Korean laws to apply.38 The original KIC legislation ultimately gave North 
.RUHD IXOO FRQWURO RYHU WKH FRPSOH[ GHVSLWH EHLQJ ³MRLQWO\ UXQ´ ZLWK WKH
South.39
There were other problems with the legislation over the language of 
some of its provisions, particularly the one dispute resolution provision.40
The language of article 46 (the dispute resolution provision) does not clearly 
define the procedures or explain the process for choosing a dispute 

36. Id. at 39-40.
37. Id. at 52.
38. Id. at 52-53.
39. Id. at 57.
40. Id. at 60.  Article 46 of the KIC Act states: 
Any disagreement arising over the development and management of the [KIC] or 
business operations in the [KIC] shall be settled through consultation among the parties 
concerned.  If the dispute cannot be settled through consultation, the parties may rely on 
commercial dispute settlement procedures agreed upon by the North and South, an 
arbitration procedure, or court proceedings.
Kaesong Industrial Zone Act, Art. 46, available at http://www.unikorea.go.kr/cwsboard/board.do?
mode=download&bid=1021&cid=18617&filename=18617201405141121367251.pdf (accessed by 
downloading pdf document).
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resolution method, which can cause North and South Korea to have differing 
interpretations.41 +RZHYHU VLQFH WKH 1RUWK .RUHDQ 6XSUHPH 3HRSOH¶V
Assembly (SPA) Presidium has the ultimate authority to interpret the 
legislation, decisions will likely favor North Korea.42 In addition, there are 
jurisdictional issues.  Specifically, the South Korean Supreme Court does 
not view North Korea as a legally independent nation, whereas North Korea 
views the South as an insurgency; yet, the international community views 
them as two independent nations.43 Thus, this poses a huge question of 
which law should be applied.
However, during the negotiations to reopen the KIC, steps were taken to 
resolve some of the problems of the original legislation by forming a joint 
committee and setting up a joint secretariat to work between the two sides.44
This would allow for more balanced control over the KIC and reduce the 
1RUWK¶VXQLODWHUDOSRZHUZKLFKZDVZKDWFDXVHGWKHVKXWGRZQ7KHLQLWLDO
agreement to normalize operations also addressed concerns of safety, 
improving communication systems within the KIC and customs clearance 
for South Koreans entering and exiting the KIC.45 Unfortunately, while 
work has resumed at the KIC, North Korea has not acted quickly on the 
agreed-upon terms and has failed to meet for the required subcommittee 
talks,46 thereby shedding light on what appears to be a more complicated 

41. You, supra note 1, at 60.
42. Id. DW³,QWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKLV>.DHVRQJ,QGXVWULDO=RQH@$ct shall be conducted by the 
3UHVLGLXP RI WKH 6XSUHPH 3HRSOH¶V $VVHPEO\´  .DHVRQJ ,QGXVWULDO =RQH $FW $GGHQGD $UW 
supra note 40.
43. You, supra note 1, at 62. 
44. N. Korea Mum on Kaesong Subcommittee Talks, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, Oct. 31, 2013, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/10/31/53/0301000000AEN20131031008100315F.ht
ml. 
45. Agreement on Normalization, supra note 11.
46. N. Korea Mum on Kaesong Subcommittee Talks, supra note 44. 
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process of fully restoring the KIC, let alone gaining international support 
and investment in the complex.
Restoring the KIC and ensuring safe and secure operations is highly 
important because it is currently the only clear sign of inter-Korean 
cooperation in the midst of repeated North Korean attacks against South 
Korea.  Thus, a positive outcome to the KIC conflict can provide guidance 
and hope for resolving other inter-Korean issues.
An examination into the bargaining strategies of both North and South 
Korea is necessary to reveal the complicated and intertwined issues that 
make up the inter-Korean relationship.  A greater understanding of each 
FRXQWU\¶VQHJRWLDWLRQSROLFLHVDQd the leverage that each side holds will help 
shed light on better ways to relieve the tension between the two Koreas and 
deter North Korea from its unpredictable and irrational threats and actions.
IV. THE RISE OF THE ³0ADMAN´
A. :KDWLVWKH³0DGPDQ7KHRU\´"
Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling is credited for his work in 
GHYHORSLQJWKH³0DGPDQ7KHRU\´SDUWLFXODUO\LQKLVERRNThe Strategy of 
Conflict.47 +HGHVFULEHGWKDW³DSDUW\FDQVWUHQJWKHQLWVSRVLWLRQE\RYHUWO\
worsening its own options, that the capability to retaliate can be more useful 
than the ability to resist an attack, and that uncertain retaliation is more 
FUHGLEOH DQG PRUH HIILFLHQW WKDQ FHUWDLQ UHWDOLDWLRQ´48 Schelling further 
H[SODLQHG WKDW ³LQ D EDUJDLQLQJ RU FRPSHWLWLYH VLWXDWLRQ RQH Hconomic 
DJHQW¶V IUDPHZRUN IRU UDWLRQDOLW\ LV QRW DOZD\V QHFHVVDULO\ DQRWKHU¶V´49

47. See generally THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1980).
48. Press Release, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 10, 2005), 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005/press.html. 
49. Jeffrey Kimball, Did Thomas C. Schelling Invent the Madman Theory?, GEORGE MASON 
UNIVERSITY HISTORY NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 24, 2005), http://hnn.us/article/17183. 
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Therefore, an individual²or in this case, a nation like North Korea²can act 
in a way that appears irrational to South Korea or the international 
community because their framework for rationality may be different.  If 
1RUWK.RUHDLVFRQVFLRXVO\³XVLQJ>LWV@XQFRQYHQWLRQDOEHKDYLRUDVSDUWRID
conscious bargaining or competitive strategy, then [its] so-called irrationality 
LVHIIHFWLYHO\UDWLRQDOLQUHODWLRQWRWKHJDPH¶VµSD\RIIV¶´50 Whether North 
Korea has adopted this type of thinking and is carrying out purposefully in 
its behavior, or is simply acting unpredictably because it does not know how 
else to behave, the impulsive actions nonetheless are creating a deterrent 
effect on South Korea and the international community.51 They are unable 
to easily respond because they recognize that North Korea does not react in 
rational ways.52
As Michael Kinsley explains in his Washington Post column, 
³>P@DGQHVVFDQEHZLFNHGO\UDWLRQDO If one of . . . two folks on [a] cliff can 
convince the other that he is just a bit nuts, that makes his threat to drag 
WKHP ERWK RII WKH FOLII PXFKPRUH SODXVLEOH´53 North Korea has built a 
UHSXWDWLRQRIEHLQJ³QXWV´DWOHDVWLQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWVEHKDYior is not similar 
to that of most other nations.  Thus, the threats that North Korea makes 
cannot help but have more credibility, and South Korea cannot help but react 
in response.  Both South Korea and other nations must believe North 

50. Id.
51. ³.LP -RQJ-un likely knows this vulnerability . . . [and is] play[ing] on such fears and 
employ[ing] a strategy of limited attacks/provocations and peace offensives to extract as much as 
SRVVLEOH>IURP6RXWK.RUHD@´6XQJ-Yoon Lee, The Boy Who Would Be King: Can Kim III Last?,
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH (Dec. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=194#.Uw-zCfldUXt.
52. 6RXWK .RUHD¶V ³SUHIHUHQFH KDV EHHQ WR SOD\ GHIHQVH DJDLQVW 3\RQJ\DQJ¶V RIIHQVH DQG
IRUJR WKH ULJKW WRSOD\RIIHQVH´  Id. As such, the North has always been the first to provoke the 
6RXWK ZLWKPLVVLOHV RU QXFOHDU WHVWV DQG ³KDV IDFHG QR QHJDWLYH UHSHUFXVVLRQ IRU VXFK DFWV   
[instead receiYLQJ@QHZDQGELJJHUFRQFHVVLRQV´IURP6RXWK.RUHDId.
53. Michael Kinsley, Op-Ed., $ 1REHO /DXUHDWH :KR¶V *RW *DPH, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/11/AR2005101101336.html. 
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.RUHD¶V WKUHDWV EHFDXVH RI WKH WKRXJKW WKDW 1RUWK .RUHD ³MXVW PLJKW EH
OXQDWLFHQRXJKWRJRRYHUWKHHGJHGHOLEHUDWHO\´54
Jonathan Schell notes in his article in The Nation WKDW³North Korea has 
UHGLVFRYHUHG WKH 0DGPDQ 7KHRU\ ZLWK D YHQJHDQFH´55 The three 
generations of its leaders²and particularly the current leader Kim Jong-
un²have developed a reputation that they are capable of acting irrationally 
and impulsively.  As a result, NRUWK .RUHD¶V WKUHDWV ³GLVSOD\   . the 
µUDWLRQDOLW\RILUUDWLRQDOLW\¶PRUHFOHDUO\WKDQDQ\RQHKDVGRQHEHIRUHVLQFH
the United States [and South Korea] ha[ve] indeed been deterred (at least so 
IDUE\LWV WKUHDWV´56 7KXV1RUWK.RUHD¶VLUUDWLRQDOLW\EHFRPHVRQHRILWV
biggest leverages against South Korea, as it freely adds and takes away 
bargaining chips on the table with its unexpected provocations.
The Madman Theory is not only limited to the North Korean leaders.  
)RUPHU 86 3UHVLGHQW 5LFKDUG 1L[RQ DOVR DGRSWHG D VLPLODU ³0DGPDQ´
strategy in his foreign policy stance.57 He wanted to make the Soviet leaders 
³WKLQN WKDW >KH@ZDVTXLWH OLWHUDOO\HPRWLRQDOO\XQVWDEOHDQGGLVMRLQWHG´E\
sending bombers and then suddenly bringing them back.58 This outwardly 
irrational behavior, which was actually internally rationalized with an 
XQGHUO\LQJJRDORIIRUFLQJWKHRWKHUVLGH¶VKDQGSURYHGWREHVXFFHVVIXOIRU
the Nixon administration.59

54. Jonathan Schell, Letter from Ground Zero, NATION, June 2, 2003, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/letter-ground-zero-3. 
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Marwan Sinaceur, Madness and the Delicate Art of Exercising Power in Negotiating,
INSEAD (July 8, 2013), http://knowledge.insead.edu/leadership-management/organisational-
behaviour/madness-and-the-delicate-art-of-exercising-power-in-negotiating-2532.   
58. Id.
59. Id.
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As INSEAD60 assistant professor Marwan Sinaceur found in his studies, 
a portrayal of emotional inconsistency and unpredictability will cause the 
other side to feel more uncertain and lose a sense of control, which most 
people do not appreciate.61 As a result, they will likely choose to make 
concessions to settle the situation.62 This is the underlying concept behind 
the Madman Theory²it gives the more unpredictable side an advantage in 
its interactions with its counterpart by making the other side feel more 
insecure.
Whether it was by chance or on purpose, North Korea has become a 
³PDGPDQ´,WLVGLIILFXOWWRIXOO\SUHGLFWKRZWKH1RUWK.RUHDQ government 
will react or what other attacks it may initiate.  While it may be impossible 
to fully understand the logic behind every decision that North Korea makes, 
LW PD\ EH SRVVLEOH WR UHGXFH WKH DPRXQW RI ³PDGQHVV´ WKDW 1RUWK .RUHD
expresses.
B. Who is WKH³0DGPDQ´"
North Korea has had three generations of dictators ruling the country 
thus far, starting with Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and currently Kim Jong-
un.63 Each of the three leaders has his own distinct personality and varying 
policies towards South Korea and the international community, but in 
general, hostility and a sense of unpredictability has remained constant.  
However, the level of impulsive behavior seems to be most heightened with 
the current North Korean leader.

60. ,16($' LV ³RQH RI WKHZRUOG¶V OHDGLQJ DQG ODUJHVW EXVLQHVV VFKRROV´ZLWKFDPSXVHV LQ
Europe, Asia, and Abu Dhabi, and partnerships with various prestigious American business schools.  
Who We Are, INSEAD, http://about.insead.edu/who_we_are/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
61. Sinaceur, supra note 57.
62. Id.
63. See Ken Gause, Leadership Transition in North Korea, COUNCIL FOR FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Jan. 2012), http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/leadership-transition-north-korea/p27071.
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When Kim Jong-un came into power in December 2011, he was only 
twenty-nine years old,64 with very little preparation to take on the role of a 
QDWLRQ¶V OHDGHU65 North Korean leaders were in the midst of training Kim 
Jong-un and transitioning him into a position of power,66 but Kim Jong-LO¶V
earlier-than-expected death sped up the process.67 As a result, Kim Jong-un 
did not receive training similar to the training his father received for almost 
two decades, or obtain the type of publicity and status that his father 
gained.68 7KXV³.LP Jong-un [was] strongly motivated to establish himself 
as a leader in his own right . . . [by] resort[ing] to calculated provocations 
against risk-DYHUVHQHLJKERUV´69 As such, the attacks against the Cheonan
DQG<HRQS\HRQJ ,VODQG ³VHUYHG   . [as an] opportunity for the regime to 
build a narrative around Kim Jong-XQ¶VPLOLWDU\OHDGHUVKLS´70
Further, at the time of Kim Il-VXQJ¶V GHDWK.LP -RQJ-il inherited the 
nation with some hope of improved diplomatic relations with foreign 
governments and a more stable economy.71 However, Kim Jong-un
inherited a nation with a worse economic state and less power and control 

64. Id.
65. David Schlangen & Allen Wagner, 7KH,PSDFWVRI1RUWK.RUHD¶V/HDGHUVKLS7UDQVLWLRQ,
NAT¶L BUREAU ASIAN RES. (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=198#.Uw-
pjvldUXt. 
66. ³.LP-RQJ-il promoted both his sister . . . and [his son] Kim Jong-un to the rank of four-
VWDUJHQHUDOHYHQWKRXJKQHLWKHUKDGVHUYHGDVLQJOHGD\LQ WKHPLOLWDU\´ Political Change in the 
DPRK, An Interview with Stephen Haggard & Daniel Pinkston, 12 ASIA POLICY 131, 132, 
http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free/AP12_F_NKoreaQA.pdf.  
67. Gause, supra note 63.  Kim Jong-LOGLHG³ORQJEHIRUHKHZDVDEOHWRIXOO\JURRPKLVVRQ
DQGKHLU´/HHsupra, note 51.  
68. Schlangen & Wagner, supra note 65.
69. Lee, supra note 51.  
70. Political Change in the DPRK, supra note 66, at 136.
71. Schlangen & Wagner, supra note 65.
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over its people.72 Thus, Kim Jong-XQ¶V\RXQJDJHODFNRIH[SHULHQFHDQG
weakened economic and societal conditions could not help but fuel a 
growing sense of tension and unpredictability in his behavior and policies.
+LV EHKDYLRU HYHQ DIIHFWHG1RUWK.RUHD¶V UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK LWV FORVHVW
DOO\&KLQDZKHQKHGLVUHJDUGHGWKH&KLQHVHOHDGHU¶VPHVVDJHQRWWRODXQFK
a ballistic missile in April 2013.73 With one decision, a relationship that had 
EHHQ³DVFORVHDVµOLSVDQGWHHWK¶´ZHDNHQHG74 Kim Jong-un was unable to 
maintain the close relationship that his father had with China.75 Jane Perlez 
reports in her New York Times article that these strained rHODWLRQV³FRXOGEHD
result of the significant age differences between the inexperienced Mr. Kim 
DQGWKHPXFKROGHU&KLQHVHOHDGHUV´76 Kim Jong-XQ¶VHUUDWLFEHKDYLRUWKXV
cannot help but suggest that he was rushed into power without sufficient 
preparation DQG WUDLQLQJ RQ KRZ EHVW WR PDLQWDLQ 1RUWK .RUHD¶V UHODWLRQV
with foreign powers, and perhaps can illustrate his growing sense of urgency 
to act provocatively to threaten other nations and induce concessions in 
order to maintain his grip of power.
In December 2013, more evidence of Kim Jong-XQ¶V HUUDWLF EHKDYLRU
was shown, when reports stated that he had his uncle Jang Song Taek 
executed for trying to overthrow the government, with state media 

72. Id  ³7KHDFXWHHFRQRPLFGLVSDULW\DORQH²per capita income in the South more than 40 
times that in the North²JLYHV WKH1RUWK.RUHDQ OHDGHUVKLS FDXVH IRU SHUPDQHQWQHXURVLV´  /HH
supra note 50.
73. Jane Perlez, North Korean Leader, Young and Defiant, Strains Ties with Chinese, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/world/asia/kim-jong-un-tests-relations-
with-china.html?r=0.
74. Id.
75. Id. Kim Jong-il was very active in his efforts to retain a good relationship with China.  
INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, at 92.  When China joined in sanctions 
against North Korea after its nuclear tests, Kim Jong-il made four trips to China within the span of a 
year to show his desire to mend relations and continue working together.  Id.
76. Perlez, supra note 71.
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GHVFULELQJ-DQJDV³GHVSLFDEOHKXPDQVFXP´77 Jang had been a prominent 
figure in North Korea and regarded as the second-most powerful individual 
who played a large role in Kim Jong-XQ¶VULVHWRSRZHU78 $VDUHVXOW-DQJ¶V
execution and the publicizing of his death can be perceived as Kim Jong-
XQ¶V GHVSHUDWH GLVSOD\ of authority.  Since Kim Jong-un is the third-
generation leader, there is growing difficulty for him to maintain the loyalty 
RI1RUWK.RUHD¶V HOLWHVZKR KDYHZHDNHU OLQNV WR KLP WKDQ WR WKH ILUVW RU
second leaders.79 ,W LVEHFRPLQJKDUGHU³WRFRQWURl the population through 
fear . . . [with] more and more North Korean elites . . . join[ing] the tens of 
WKRXVDQGVRIRUGLQDU\FLWL]HQVZKRKDYHIOHGWKHFRXQWU\´80 Thus, much of 
Kim Jong-XQ¶V H[WHUQDO SURYRFDWLRQV DQG WKUHDWV DJDLQVW RWKHU FRXQWULHV
appear to stem from a domestic interest in reiterating a sense of fear and 
dominance over the North Korean people.
In addition to Kim Jong-XQ¶VRZQSHUVRQDOWUDLWVDQGIDFWRUVLQIOXHQFLQJ
WKH QDWLRQ¶V XQSUHGLFWDELOLW\ WKHUH LV DOVR WKH XQGHUO\LQJ IDFW WKDW 1RUWK
Korea is very secluded and has no strong allies.  Due to the weakened 
relationship between North Korea and China in the spring after Kim Jong-
XQ¶VGHILDQFHRI WKH&KLQHVH OHDGHU81 North Korea has backed itself into a 
corner without much support.  Since North Korea is outnumbered, it needs 
to find a way to exert its power against the international community²
particularly South Korea and the United States²to continue to prove (both 
to foreign governments and its own people) that it is still a powerful state 

77. Jethro Mullen, 1RUWK.RUHD¶V.LP-RQJ8Q/DXGV3XUJHRI([HFXWHG8QFOH -DQJ6RQJ
Thaek, CNN (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/31/world/asia/north-korea-kim-jong-un-
speech/.
78. Id.
79. Lee, supra note 50.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
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and will not be bullied.82 As a result, the development of nuclear weapons in 
WKHQDWLRQFDQEHVHHQDVSDUWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VVWUDWHJ\WRWU\WRSURWHFWLWVHOI
This understanding of Kim Jong-XQDQG1RUWK.RUHD¶VFXUUHQWVWDWHKHOS
to rationalize the bizarre behavior of North Korea: the recent attacks on 
South Korea, the cancellation of the scheduled family reunions, and the 
unilateral closure and reopening of the KIC.  It is acting in these 
unpredictable ways to protect itself and maintain command.  North Korea
acts in ways it deems necessary to trigger a particular response from South 
Korea to show that it is capable of carrying out its threats and to instill a 
sense of fear in the domestic and international community.  This behavior 
can be described as the MadPDQ 7KHRU\ RU DOVR WKH ³UDWLRQDOLW\ RI
LUUDWLRQDOLW\´83
V. STOPPING THE ³0ADMAN´
³)RU WKH SDVW ILIW\ \HDUV 1RUWK .RUHD KDV OLHG EURNHQ LWV ZRUG DQG
pushed tensions to the brink of war, and negotiations with this country have 
routinely been unproductive LI QRW RXWULJKW IDLOXUHV´84 How, then, can 
6RXWK.RUHDDQGWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\VWRSWKLV³PDGPDQ´"
A. Development of South Korean Policies Towards North Korea
7KH .,& ZDV HVWDEOLVKHG GXULQJ DQ HUD RI 6RXWK .RUHD¶V 6XQVKLQH
Policy from 1998 to 2008.85 During this period, South Korea emphasized 

82. Tan, supra QRWH  DW   ³$QDO\VWV DWWULEXWH 1RUWK .RUHD¶V GHVLUH IRU ZHDSRQV WR
several factors, such as deterrence against a perceived Western threat, a bargaining chip to gain 
political and economic advantages, or as a natural extension of the national ideoloJ\´Id.
83. Kimball, supra note 49.
84. Tan, supra note 22, at 519.
85. Donald Kirk, Op-Ed., 7KH6XQVHWRI6RXWK.RUHD¶V µ6XQVKLQH3ROLF\¶, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
20, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/20/opinion/oe-kirk20. 
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cooperation with North Korea, allowing tensions to ease.86 However, amid 
WKH JURZLQJ SXEOLF GLVFRQWHQW ZLWK 6RXWK .RUHD¶V DSSHDVHPHQWV WR WKH
1RUWKWKHUHYHODWLRQRI1RUWK.RUHD¶VFRQWLQXLQJQXFOHDUSURJUDPs, and the 
1RUWK¶V DWWDFNV RQ 6RXWK .RUHD FRPELQHG ZLWK WKH WUDQVLWLRQ RI 6RXWK
Korean leadership to the more conservative Lee Myung-bak administration 
in 2008, the Sunshine Policy ceased.87 When President Park Geun-hye was 
running for the presidency after the Lee administration, she emphasized 
GHVLUHV WR LPSURYH UHODWLRQV ZLWK 1RUWK .RUHD E\ DGRSWLQJ ³WKH VWURQJHVW
HOHPHQWVRIERWKWKHKDUGOLQHDQGHQJDJHPHQWSROLFLHV´RIKHUSUHGHFHVVRUV
to deal with North Korea.88 However, the change in North Korean 
leadership to Kim Jong-un and the attacks by the North on the Cheonan and 
Yeonpeong have caused her to take a more cautious approach.  Currently, 
3DUN¶V DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ KDV DGRSWHG D ³7UXVW-%XLOGLQJ3URFHVV´ DV LWV1RUWK
Korean policy.89 The three key objectives are: (1) to improve inter-Korean 
ties; (2) to establish peace on the Korean peninsula; and (3) to lay the 
groundwork for unification.90 The underlying long-term vision of the 
current administration is unification of the two Koreas.91

86. Id. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung even won a Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for 
implementing the Sunshine Policy.  Id.
87. Id.; South Korea Formally Declares End to Sunshine Policy, VOICE OF AMERICA (Nov. 
17, 2010), http://www.voanews.com/content/south-korea-formally-declares-end-to-sunshine-policy--
108904544/130750.html; Ihn-hwi Park, The Park Geun-hye Presidency and the Future of the U.S.-
South Korea Alliance, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 2013), http://www.cfr.org/south-
korea/park-geun-hye-presidency-future-us-south-korea-alliance/p30183. 
88. Park, supra note 87.
89. Trust-Building Process Policy, Major Objective, MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION,
http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1782 (last visited Jan. 24, 2015); Minister Ryoo Talks 
about Trust-Building Process, MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1832&mode=view&page=15&cid=31066.
90. Minister Ryoo Talks about Trust-Building Process, supra note 89.
91. See also Vision Statement, MINISTRY OF UNIFICATION,
http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1773 (last visited Jan. 24, 2015). 
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As evidenced by the KIC shutdown, giving North Korea too much free 
UHLJQ ZLOO WLH 6RXWK .RUHD¶V KDQGV PDNLQJ LW YHU\ GLIILFXOW IRU LW WR GR
anything until North Korea chooses to yield on something.  When North 
.RUHDVD\V³QR´WKHUHVHHPVWREHQRZD\WRJHWDURXQGWKDWZDOO.  North 
Korea similarly refused to proceed with the family reunions that had been 
scheduled for the fall of 2013.92 Thus, South Korea needs to find a way to 
UHVSRQG WR 1RUWK .RUHD¶V XQLODWHUDO SURYRFDWLRQV WR HYHQ RXW WKLV SRZHU
imbalance and show that North Korea cannot keep behaving erratically to 
obtain concessions.  While the reforms in the KIC legislation and the new 
agreements for a joint-committee to oversee the KIC are helpful steps in that 
GLUHFWLRQ1RUWK.RUHD¶VIDLOXUHWRFDUU\RXWDOORIWKHWerms is evidence that 
D QHZ DJUHHPHQW DORQH LV QRW VWURQJ HQRXJK WR HVWDEOLVK 6RXWK .RUHD¶V
power or to pressure North Korea into following the agreement terms.
B. Maintaining Composure and Balancing Interests
While it is certainly important to ensure that appropriate legislations and 
policies are in place, South Korea cannot rely on those alone to protect itself 
IURP WKH1RUWK¶V LUUDWLRQDOLW\  6RXWK.RUHD QHHGV WRPDLQWDLQ FRPSRVXUH
DQGQRWJHWFDXJKWXSLQ1RUWK.RUHD¶VXQSUHGLFWDEOHDQGLPSXOVLYHDFWLRQs.

92. North and South Korea finally held two rounds of family reunions in February 2014²the 
reunions that were originally scheduled for September 2013.  Hyung-jin Kim, As Tearful Korean 
Reunions End, More Seem Unlikely, STRIPES KOREA, Feb. 26, 2014, 
http://korea.stripes.com/news/tearful-korean-reunions-end-more-seem-unlikely.  The initial efforts to 
hold reunions in 2013, the cancellation, and the new efforts to schedule reunions in 2014 
GHPRQVWUDWH RQFH DJDLQ WKH LQFRQVLVWHQF\ RI 1RUWK .RUHD¶V EHKDYLRU DQG WKH GLIILFXOW\ IRU RWKHU
QDWLRQVWRSUHGLFW1RUWK.RUHD¶VDFWLRQV<HWHYHQWKLVVHWRIUHXQLRQVDOPRVWGLGQRWKDSSHQGXHWR
1RUWK.RUHD¶VWKUHDWVWRFDQFHOEHFDXVHRIMRLQW military drills between the United States and South 
Korea.  Id. The drills were not canceled, with both South Korea and the United States viewing the 
IDPLO\ UHXQLRQV DV ³DSXUHO\ KXPDQLWDULDQ LVVXH´ DQG QRW LQWHUWZLQHGZLWK SROLWLFDO LVVXHVZKLFK
North Korea was attempting to do.  Paula Hancocks et al., North and South Korea Hold First Family 
Reunion in Three Years, CNN (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/20/world/asia/koreas-
reunion/. 
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7KHJRDO RI1RUWK.RUHD¶V ³PDGPDQ´EHKDYLRU LV WR SXVK6RXWK.RUHD WR
make certain concessions²GHFLVLRQV WKDW ZLOO EH LQ 1RUWK .RUHD¶V IDYRU
As such, South Korea needs to maintain objectivity in its interactions with 
North Korea, make sure to look carefully at the particular issue at hand, and 
make decisions that will help to resolve that individual issue without making 
unnecessary concessions or reaching other unrelated agreements.93
Particularly with the KIC, South Korea needs to recognize the 
importance of the KIC to the North Korean economy and use that as 
leverage.  The KIC provides jobs to North Koreans, and currently employs 
53,000 North Koreans for around $160 per month, which is a generous sum 
for North Koreans.94 7KXV WKH .,& LV D ³VRXUFH RI much-needed hard 
FXUUHQF\´ IRU1RUWK.RUHD95 South Korea also supplies electricity to the 
complex to ensure that there will not be any blackouts,96 thereby shouldering 
much of the necessary operating costs and burdens.  Thus, since the KIC is 

93. North Korea seems to have wanted ³WR XVH WKH UHXQLRQV DV a way to win political and 
humanitarian concessions from the conservative government of South Korean President Park Geun-
hye . . . .  During the more liberal South Korean government rule that ended six years ago, Seoul 
rewarded Pyongyang with rice and ferWLOL]HU VKLSPHQWV IRU DUUDQJLQJ WKH IDPLO\ UHXQLRQV´ Kim, 
supra note 92.  :KLOH6RXWK.RUHDVHHPV³XQOLNHO\WRDSSURYHELJDLGVKLSPHQWVIRUPRUHUHXQLRQV
XQOHVV1RUWK.RUHDDOVRWDNHVVHULRXVQXFOHDUGLVDUPDPHQWPHDVXUHV´6RXWK.RUHDKDVRIIHUHGWR
send vaccines after North Korea reported its first outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease since January 
 ZKLFK ZRXOG EH 6RXWK .RUHD¶V ILUVW GLUHFW JRYHUQPHQW-level aid shipment to North Korea 
since all aid ended in 2010.  Id. It appears that the Park administration is trying to show that they are 
not willing to reward North Korea for agreeing to the reunions (which would continue to feed the 
³0DGPDQ´EXWDWWKHVDPHWLPHWU\LQJWRHDVHWHQVLRQVDQGLPSURYHUHODWLRQVE\VKRZLQJDJHVWXUH
of aid.
94. Andrew Salmon, Inside North Korea: Could the Kaesong Complex Give Hope for the 
Future? TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 24, 2013, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10535828/Inside-North-Korea-Could-
the-Kaesong-complex-give-hope-for-the-future.html [hereinafter Inside North Korea].
95. Ju-min Park & Hyun Young Yi, A Week after Purge, Business as Usual at N. Korean 
Factory Park, REUTERS, Dec. 19, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/uk-korea-north-
kaesong-idUKBRE9BI0C820131219.
96. Inside North Korea, supra note 94.
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important to North Korea, there is likely some kind of limit to its erratic 
behavior when dealing with the KIC.  Despite holding out for 160 days, 
North Korea eventually did agree to reopen the KIC, indicating that there is 
some need or desire on its part to continue operations at the KIC.
On the other hand, the KIC is also beneficial to South Korea.  With the 
complex located only thirty-seven miles from downtown Seoul, the KIC is a 
convenient and cost-efficient source of labor for South Korean companies.97
Businesses investing in the KIC are profiting more than their counterparts 
that are investing in Chinese plants.98 The complex is also important to 
6RXWK .RUHD EHFDXVH ³.DHVRQJ UHSUHVHQWV WKH 6RXWK¶V RQO\ HFRQRPLF
foothold inside its estranged neighbour.´99 7KH.,&SURYLGHV WKH 6RXWK¶V
only link into North Korea as of now, which could become a key component 
in future Korean reunification.  However, because the KIC is also of value to 
South Korea, it needs to be careful that the North does not use the 
importance of the KIC to the South as leverage against it.
C. Using Outside Leverage
While bilateral negotiations between the South and North were effective 
in restarting operations at the KIC, there may be times when direct 
negotiations become difficult and yield no results.  At this point, South 
Korea needs to use its greatest leverage²its support from the United States 
and the international community²LQ SURWHFWLQJ LWVHOI IURP1RUWK .RUHD¶V
LUUDWLRQDOEHKDYLRU³2QHZD\WRHTXDOL]HRUH[FHHGWKHSRZHURIDVtronger 
party is to form an alliance with others who share an interest in working 

97. You, supra note 1, at 43.
98. Id. at 44.
99. Andrew Salmon, $*OLPSVH,QVLGH.DHVRQJ1RUWK.RUHD¶V&XULRXV&DSLWDOLVW2XWSRVW, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 21, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1386568/glimpse-
inside-kaesong-north-koreas-curious-capitalist-outpost.
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DJDLQVWWKHVWURQJHUSDUW\´100 While it is debatable that North Korea is the 
³VWURQJHU´ SDUW\ LWV PDGPDQ TXDOLWLHV FHUWDLQO\ FUHDWH D GHWHUULQJ HIIHFW
against South Korea.  Thus, if South Korea can build relationships with 
others who also have an interest in North Korea, then that joint power could 
create more effective leverage.
For example, getting foreign businesses to invest in the KIC will 
inevitably cause foreign governments to grow an interest in what goes on in 
the KIC and in North Korea.  An increase in foreign investment in Kaesong 
may be a starting point to ensure that North Korea does not unilaterally 
shutdown the KIC in the future.  This can shift a bilateral relationship 
between the North and South into a multilateral relationship, creating more 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\DQGOD\HUVRISURWHFWLRQIRU6RXWK.RUHDDJDLQVW WKH1RUWK¶V
rash actions.  Further, if North Korea fails to meet certain terms of the KIC 
legislation or agreements, there are consequences that North Korea will face 
from the multiple governments, not just from South Korea, reducing the 
OLNHOLKRRGRIWKH1RUWK¶VHUUDWLFEHKDYLRU
8QIRUWXQDWHO\ DQG LURQLFDOO\ WKH XQFHUWDLQW\ RI WKH .,&¶V IXWXUH
particularly because the complex is operated in North Korea, poses difficulty 
in attracting foreign investors.  Recently, foreign investors have had 
opportunities to visit and tour the complex.101 +RZHYHU ³FRQFHUQV DERXW
transport, lengthy customs processes and communicDWLRQV´ SUHYHQWV
potential investors from willingly initiating operations at the KIC.102 Visits 
into the KIC require a three-day notice, and there is no internet or mobile 
access in the complex.103 There is a lack of transparency and accountability, 

100. Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power 
Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 105 (2000).
101. Inside North Korea, supra note 94.
102. Id.
103. Salmon, supra note 99.
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which is not a great selling point for foreign investors.104 Even South 
Korean investment in the KIC is currently static.105
Thus, South Korea needs to first stabilize operations at the KIC and 
demonstrate that South Korean companies are benefiting from the complex, 
WKHQDVVLVW1RUWK.RUHD¶VELGVWRIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUV7KH.,&LVDQH[SHQVLYH
³V\PERO RI UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ DQG SHDFH´ EHFDXVH WKH 6RXWK QHHGV WR GR
everything for North Korea to ensure that the KIC continues to operate 
smoothly.106 However, South Korea needs to recognize that its own 
investment and the investment of foreign companies in the KIC will be 
highly beneficial not only to North Korea, but also to the South as it can 
neutralize the rocky relationship that it has with North Korea.
On the flip side, South Korea needs to convince foreign investors to 
FKRRVHWKH.,&RYHURWKHUVLPLODUODERUVRXUFHVGHVSLWH6RXWK.RUHD¶VRZQ
underlying political goal to maintain and improve its relationship with the 
North through the KIC.107 South Korea needs to show that it can minimize 
1RUWK .RUHD¶V XQSUHGLFWDELOLW\ DQG UHGXFH ULVN VR WKDW WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
community will be interested in investing even though the KIC is an inter-
Korean symbol for potential reunification.  Investors need to trust that they 
will not be used mHUHO\DVSDZQVLQDLGLQJWKH.RUHDV¶UHODWLRQVKLSEXWZLOO
also benefit from their investments in the complex.
D. Creating a Unified Front
While the participation of the international community is crucial for 
South Korea in maintaining its power against North Korea, past attempts at 
multilateral negotiations through the Six Party Talks proved to be 

104. Id.
105. Inside North Korea, supra note 94.  
106. Salmon, supra note 99.
107. Inside North Korea, supra note 94.
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unsuccessful.  The Six Party Talks halted when North Korea refused to 
continue participating, and instead lashed out by firing torpedoes and shells 
in South Korean waters.108 1RUWK .RUHD¶V HUUDWLF EHKDYLRU GXULQJ
negotiations and impulsive actions make it difficult for the remaining parties 
WRILJXUHRXW1RUWK.RUHD¶VWUXHPRWLYDWLQJIDFWRUV109 However, the failure 
of the Six Party Talks likely does not rest with North Korea alone.  Each of 
WKH JRYHUQPHQWV LQYROYHG ³SODFHG WKHLU RZQ LPPHGLDWH SULRULWLHV DQG
FRQFHUQV DERYH WKH FROOHFWLYH QHHG WR KDOW 1RUWK .RUHD¶V QXFOHDU
SURJUDP´110 making it difficult for them to have a fully unified front against 
North Korea.
This lack of a unified front from the global community continues to this 
GD\  &KLQD ³EHOLHYH>V@ WKDW PDLQWDLQLQJ WKH VWDWXV TXR RQ WKH >.RUHDQ@
peninsula is advantageous to its own economic development and national 
VHFXULW\´111 Thus, while it does condemn NorWK.RUHD¶VPLVVLOH ODXQFKHV
and nuclear tests, it is more passive in sanctioning North Korea.112 Japan, on 
the other hand, takes a harder stance against North Korea, supporting South 
.RUHD¶VDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIVDQFWLRQV113 The United 
States has responded to North Korea with strong condemnation of North 

108. You, supra note 1, at 37.
109. Bajoria & Xu, supra note 25.
110. Id.
111. INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, at 94.    
112. Id.
China has its own internal divisions on North Korea policy.  On the one hand, [it] values 
North Korea as a buffer state. . . .  On the other hand, there are Chinese analysts who see 
North Korea as an anachronism and even a potential threat to core Chinese interests. . . .  
But in the end the Chinese are most concerned about stability on their border. . . .  
Beijing is unlikely to exert strong pressure to bring North Korea around. . . .  In effect, 
China is pursuing its owQ YDULDQW RI WKH 6XQVKLQH 3ROLF\ GHHSHQLQJ 1RUWK .RUHD¶V
dependence on China in the process.
Political Change in the DPRK, supra note 66, at 138 (emphasis added).
113. INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, at 90.
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Korean actions, eventually even suspending food aid.114 It is particularly 
YRFDODJDLQVW1RUWK.RUHD¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPVDQGXQZLOOLQJQHVV WRGLVDUP
according to agreements made,115 DQG ³LV Vkeptical about sitting down for 
WDONVLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDQ\VLJQWKDWWKH\ZLOOEHPHDQLQJIXO´116 Generally, 
Chinese and Russian opinions conflicted with those of the United States and 
Japan, particularly with regard to the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents.  
7KHVHGLIIHUHQFHVOLNHO\DURVHRXWRI³FRQIOLFWLQJLQWHUHVWVRIWKHFRQFHUQHG
SDUWLHVLQUHJDUGWRWKHFRPSHWLWLRQIRULQIOXHQFHLQ1RUWKHDVW$VLD´117
However, recognition of these conflicting interests can guide South 
Korea and other nations in their approach to renegotiating and normalizing 
relations with North Korea.  It is clear that pushing North Korea onto the 
OHGJH FDQ OHDG WR GDQJHURXV UHVXOWV DV LWZLOO IXHOPRUH RI1RUWK.RUHD¶V
irrational behavior, such as pulling out of the Talks and attacking South 
Korea.  Thus, ganging up against North Korea with numbers will not be the 
best approach.  At the same time, there needs to be a clear understanding 
that while various governments may have particular priorities and interests, 
they are unified in thHLUVWDQFHDJDLQVW1RUWK.RUHD¶VLUUDWLRQDOLW\:LWKWKDW
understanding, they can then apply a healthy amount of pressure to convince 
North Korea that there will be consequences for its actions.
E. Separating the Issues
Thus, applying these principles to the KIC, South Korea cannot make 
outrageous threats because North Korea may unilaterally shut down the 

114. Id. at 85.  
115. Id. at 83-³>7@KH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQPDGHLWFOHDUWKDWZLWKRXWWKH1RUWK¶VFRPSOHWH
dismantlement of nuclear weapons and clearing of all suspicions, a normalization of relations would 
EHLPSRVVLEOH´Id. DW³,QKLV6WDWHRIWKH8QLRQDGGUHVVLQ002, President Bush condemned 
1RUWK.RUHDDVFRQVWLWXWLQJDQµD[LVRIHYLO¶´Id. at 77.
116. Political Change in the DPRK, supra note 66, at 138.
117. INSTITUTE OF UNIFICATION EDUCATION, supra note 14, at 72.
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complex again, nor can they mix up their priorities in dealing with North 
Korea.  While South Korea has many issues that it wants to resolve²
denuclearizing North Korea, proceeding with the family reunions, preparing 
for a potential unification²it needs to recognize that when dealing with 
North Korea over the KIC, it must solely focus on improving operations at 
the KIC, and not get lost amidst the other issues at hand.  Since the current 
policy is the Trust-Building Process with an underlying desire for 
unification, it is appropriate to recognize the potential tool that the KIC can 
play in aiding future inter-Korean relations.  However, South Korea has to 
continue to ensure that the KIC is dealt with as a separate issue, just as it 
separated the family reunions from the joint military training held by South 
.RUHD DQG WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV GHVSLWH1RUWK.RUHD¶V HIIRUWV WR WU\ WR OXPS
them together as one issue to use the reunions as a leverage in ceasing the 
military trainings.118
Normalizing operations at the KIC and improving the KIC are important 
DQGXUJHQWJRDOVDVWKLVWLHVLQZLWKWKH3DUNDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V1RUWK.RUHDQ
policy of trust-building, and can be a practical application of this policy.  
The family reunions were also part of this, but they have more of a personal 
effect on the families that participated.  However, the KIC has economic 
value to both Koreas, and thus, the impact of an improved KIC can be felt 
more greatly on both sides of the 38th parallel.  And an effective resolution 
to the KIC can be seen as hope for future joint projects between the Koreas 
as symbols of small-scale unifications to hopefully lead to greater measures 
for inter-Korean unification.
VI. CONCLUSION
1RUWK.RUHD¶VSROLFLHVDUHWKHHSLWRPHRIWKH0DGPDQ7KHRU\DQGWKH
recent conflict over the KIC provides a framework to analyze how North 

118. See supra text accompanying note 92.
28
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss3/8
[Vol. 15: 639, 2015] Stopping the Madman
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
667
Korea is using its erratic behavior to pose an almost unstoppable threat 
against South Korea.  However, the new agreement reached by the two 
Koreas to resume operations at the KIC amidst other conflicts demonstrates 
that there may be room for the governments to overcome impasse on other 
issues in the future as well.  The critical point, however, will rest with South 
.RUHDDQGZKHWKHULWFDQILQGDZD\WRUHVLVWEHLQJVZHSWXSE\WKH1RUWK¶V
unpredictable actions, but instead remain objective and use its power and 
OHYHUDJHWRFRXQWHUWKH1RUWK¶VLUUDWLRQDOLW\7KHQWKH.,&PD\QRORQJHU
be a mere symbol of cooperation, but an actual tool in aiding inter-Korean 
unification.
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